The Cuban Missile Crisis: Thirteen Days Through Contemporary Reports and Personal Accounts

At 8:45 on the morning of October 16, 1962, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy walked into the White House and told President John F. Kennedy that a major international crisis was at hand. Two days earlier, a U.S. military surveillance aircraft had taken hundreds of aerial photographs of Cuba. CIA analysts, working around the clock, had deciphered in the pictures conclusive evidence that a Soviet missile base was under construction near San Cristobal, Cuba—just 90 miles from the coast of Florida. The world was about to enter the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War.

What Happened?

The crisis unfolded over thirteen days, from October 16 to October 28, 1962, and is now known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following sequence, drawn from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum and the National Security Archive, traces the central events:

• October 15: U.S. intelligence photographs taken by a U-2 spy plane reveal Soviet ballistic missile sites in Cuba.
• October 16: Kennedy is briefed; he immediately assembles an executive committee (ExComm) of senior advisers to deliberate on options.
• October 22: Kennedy addresses the nation, announcing a naval quarantine of Cuba and demanding the removal of the missiles. He warns that any missile launched from Cuba would be considered an attack on the United States.
• October 24: Soviet ships heading toward Cuba stop and turn back, easing the immediate threat of confrontation.
• October 26: Khrushchev sends a long, emotional letter to Kennedy, proposing to withdraw missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.
• October 27: The most dangerous day: a U-2 is shot down over Cuba, and the U.S. military requests permission to attack the missile sites. Kennedy resists, and a second letter from Khrushchev demands the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a condition.
• October 28: Khrushchev publicly agrees to remove the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba. The immediate crisis ends.

These dates and details are established in the official records and the personal recollections of participants, including Robert F. Kennedy’s memoir Thirteen Days.

How It Was Seen at the Time

Contemporaries experienced the crisis as an imminent nuclear apocalypse. The language of the era was apocalyptic—news reports spoke of a “showdown” and “brinkmanship.” In his October 22 address, President Kennedy described the situation in stark terms:

“This country is confronted with a crisis that could lead to a nuclear war. We are not going to have a nuclear war unless the Soviet Union starts it.”

The mood among the American public was a mixture of dread and resolve. Many families began stocking bomb shelters, and newspapers ran stories about the possibility of atomic attack. At the same time, a sense of patriotic duty prevailed; the quarantine was seen as a necessary test of American will. In the White House, the ExCom deliberated in secret, and the fear was palpable. As Robert F. Kennedy later wrote in his memoir, “We were on the edge of the precipice.” The crisis was understood as a duel between the superpowers, with the world watching.

Historical Snapshot

Eyewitness Accounts

Those inside the White House left vivid accounts. Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General and a key member of the ExCom, wrote a personal memoir titled Thirteen Days that remains a primary source. In it, he described the tension in the ExCom meetings:

“We were in the White House, and the military was pressing for an air strike. But the President held back. He said, ‘It’s not the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth, fifth, and sixth steps.’”

CIA analysts who examined the photographs also gave testimony. Their initial reports, later declassified, described the missile sites with clinical precision, but the human drama behind them was intense. One analyst recalled the moment the evidence was confirmed: “We had to look at the photographs again and again. We knew that this was the beginning of a crisis that could end the world.”

Letters & Diaries

The private correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev is among the most important primary sources of the crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev wrote a long, rambling letter to Kennedy, proposing that the missiles be removed if the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba. The letter was described by historians as “emotional” and “desperate.” In it, Khrushchev wrote:

“I see, Mr. President, that you are not a fool. The United States and the Soviet Union are the two strongest countries on earth. If we cannot agree, we will both be destroyed.”

The next day, a second, more formal letter arrived, adding the condition of removing U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Kennedy’s diary and his brother’s memoir reveal the internal debate over how to respond. The letters were kept secret at the time, but they show the personal stakes and the fear of miscalculation.

Official Reports

The CIA’s intelligence reports formed the backbone of the U.S. response. The JFK Library holds the original photographs and the briefing materials. The CIA’s “Board of National Estimates” concluded on October 16 that the Soviet Union had placed medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, capable of striking the U.S. eastern seaboard. The report stated: “The Soviet Union has now taken a step that can only be considered a direct challenge to the United States.” The official records also show that the U.S. military recommended an immediate air strike and invasion, but Kennedy chose the naval quarantine. The official reports of the crisis, now declassified, show the military’s readiness for war and the diplomatic channels that ultimately prevailed.

What People Feared

At the time, the most pervasive fear was of a nuclear war that would kill millions. Newspapers and radio broadcasts fueled this fear. Many Americans built fallout shelters and stocked supplies. Schools conducted drills, and there was talk of evacuation plans for major cities. The fear was not unfounded: the U.S. military was at DEFCON 2, the highest alert level in history, and Soviet submarines were armed with nuclear torpedoes. The National Security Archive notes that October 27, 1962, was “the most dangerous day” of the crisis, when a U.S. U-2 was shot down and the military pressed for an attack. The public, however, did not know the full extent of the danger. The government kept the most frightening details secret, including the fact that the Soviet missiles were already operational.

What People Expected Would Happen Next

Many contemporaries expected war. In the ExCom, some advisers predicted that a naval quarantine would lead to a Soviet ship confrontation and then to a nuclear exchange. The public opinion polls showed that a majority of Americans believed that war with the Soviet Union was likely. On the other side, Khrushchev’s advisers in Moscow also feared a U.S. attack. Some diplomats expected a compromise, but the prevailing mood was one of uncertainty and dread. The eventual outcome—a secret deal that removed missiles from both Cuba and Turkey—was not known to the public until much later. In the immediate aftermath, the American people were relieved but also aware that the crisis could have gone the other way. The expectations of a long-term arms race were confirmed, but the immediate expectation of war proved wrong.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point in the Cold War. The primary sources—the letters, the photographs, the speeches, and the personal recollections—show how close the world came to catastrophe. They also reveal the courage and the caution of the leaders who chose diplomacy over war. The thirteen days in October 1962 remain a lesson in the power of restraint and the fragility of peace.